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Abstract – Studying near-miss events – occasions when a company comes close to being 
negatively impacted – can help identify systemic issues and thereby enhance organizational 
resilience. However, what is not known is how firms learn from near-miss events, and how their 
learning is translated into response strategies in the face of supply chain disruptions. In this 
study, we address the following research questions - How does exposure to near-misses reflect in 
organizational response strategies to supply chain disruptions? Using single and double-loop 
learning from organizational learning theory, we examine how firms implement response 
strategies based on near-miss events. In addition, we examine the moderating effects of 
institutional pressures (from regulatory bodies and industry associations) into the model. We test 
the hypotheses using responses from 448 organizations in Germany, Switzerland and Sweden. 
Our results indicate that exposure to near-miss events leads firms to strengthen their focus on 
procedural response strategies and to lower their focus on flexible response strategies. Industry 
pressure furthers the effects of near-miss exposure in applying procedural strategies and limiting 
the application of flexible strategies. Regulatory pressure furthers the effects of near-miss 
exposure in limiting the application of flexible strategies. This study extends the body of supply 
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chain disruption management to the concept of near-misses and explains how institutional 
context play a major role in learning of supply chain disruption responses. 
 
Highlights 
 Near-miss events strengthen the firm’s procedural response strategies and lower focus on 
flexible response strategies. 
 Industry pressure moderates the relationship between near-miss events and procedural 
response strategies (strengthens) and flexible response strategies (weakens). 
 Regulatory pressure weakens the relationship between near-miss exposure and flexible 
response strategies. 
 
Keywords: Near-miss; Flexible response strategy; Procedural response strategy; Single-loop 
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Introduction 
 
Today’s ever more complicated and global business environment has led many companies to 
become concerned about risks and disruptions in their supply chains (Azadegan and Jayaram, 
2018; Shaheen et al., 2017). As supply chain disruptions become seemingly more damaging and 
prevalent, company preparedness and response have also raised in importance (Culp, 2013; Scott, 
2016).  
Management scholars postulated different theoretical lenses to examine risk in 
organizations and ways to mitigate them. For instance, normal accident theory (NAT) suggests 
that accidents are inevitable and occur due to tight coupling between components and also due to 
the complexity of systems (Perrow, 1994). The Swiss cheese model suggests that firms can 
minimize risks by incorporating both hard (systems based) and soft (people based) 
countermeasures (Reason, 1990). Yet, there will be instances where the countermeasures may 
fail due to the perfect alignment of events and conditions. High-reliability organization (HRO) 
researchers posit that we can learn a lot from organizations that are prone to catastrophic failures 
but do not manifest as frequently, such as aircraft carriers, air traffic control or nuclear power 
plants (Roberts, 1990; Speier et al., 2011). These theories were postulated to help manage major 
failures. Yet, major failures do not occur frequently enough to gain substantial understanding 
from them. Further, while these theories are effective in analyzing the reasons behind failures, 
they may not be able to provide insights on how to prevent these failures (Reason, 1990). HRO 
researchers and proponents of the Swiss cheese model recommended the use of near-misses in 
large-scale systems as an alternative reporting mechanism to understand vulnerabilities in the 
operational processes and routines (Grabowski and Roberts, 1997). 
Near-misses are occasions when a company comes close to being negatively impacted but 
is not (Habermann et al., 2015). Whereas deviations from operational norms may propagate 
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across the supply chain and cause breakdowns, identifying and studying near-misses can help 
deter such damaging occurrences (Pettit et al., 2010). Near-miss events raise awareness and 
preparedness in facing supply chain disruptions (Sheaffer et al., 1998). Across an assortment of 
scientific fields, there are strong theoretically based arguments and empirical evidence on how 
attention to near-misses can be a viable approach to error identification (Baumard and Starbuck, 
2005; Kleindorfer et al., 2012). As we will detail in upcoming sections, literature in medical 
research, psychology, safety science, healthcare, and transportation have all offered substantial 
evidence on the potential benefits of tracking near-misses. In organization science, Perrow 
(2011) suggests that “almost disruptions” are a good indicator of risks in systems. Others suggest 
that near-misses provide opportunities to better understand the resilience of an organization to 
better detect and prioritize risks (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008; Sheffi, 2015).   
Studying the effect of near-misses on organizational behavior in supply chain contexts is 
particularly important given the growing dependency of companies on upstream suppliers 
(Sheffi, 2015). Today’s fast-moving business environment requires organizations to be diligent 
so as to quickly respond to harmful events in their operating environment (Dabhilkar et al., 
2016). Detecting and analyzing near-misses is one way to prepare for, and even prevent, supply 
chain disruptions (Sheffi, 2015). Risk management experts suggest that near-misses could be 
opportunities that remind top management on taking the necessary steps to avert their supply 
chain from major disruptions (Rothman, 2014). The following examples illustrate such a case in 
the supply chain context.  
In early February 2016, a strong earthquake shook production facilities belonging to 
TSMC in southern Taiwan. TSMC is the sole supplier of the A10 processor for Apple’s iPhone 
7. TSMC and Apple were lucky. Sensitive production machinery and the inventories of silicon 
wafers used in producing the processors were left unharmed (Webb, 2016). TSMC and its 
 
 
International Journal of Production Economics, Azadegan, Srinivasan, Blome, 
Tajeddini 
 
 Page 5 
downstream customers did not take the issue lightly. Shortly after the event, they developed 
procedures for alternate sources of supply and for improving their responsiveness to similar 
supply chain disruptions. For Cisco Systems, the impetus to improve its supply chain risk 
management infrastructure was the company’s close call with Hurricane Rita in 2005 (Conway et 
al., 2015). Because of the near-miss, company executives recognized that “they were not fully 
prepared to respond systematically to a major event” (Sowinski, 2011; pp 3).  
Not all companies take near-misses as seriously as TSMC or Cisco Systems do. Despite 
the copious theoretical support and empirical evidence for the usefulness of near-misses, many 
companies are apathetic to their utility. Some consider near-misses as “transitory events” that 
result in “superstitious learning” (Lampel et al., 2009). Others view near-misses as too minor and 
inconsequential (Wright and van der Schaaf, 2004). Such apprehensions may be caused by a lack 
of recognition of the lessons that near-misses can offer. Indeed, how learning from near-misses 
leads to organizational behaviors in facing disruptions has yet to be studied in supply chain 
management research. Hence, our primary research question is: How does exposure to near-
misses reflect in organizational response strategies to supply chain disruptions?  
When faced with disruptions, companies orient their response efforts in two strategic 
directions: some use a procedural strategy while others use a flexible strategy (Deverell and 
Olsson, 2010; Harrald, 2006). We define procedural response strategy as formal protocols 
followed by organizations when managing disruptions. This may include formal policies and 
procedures, assigned roles and responsibilities and resources allocated appropriately. From an 
organizational standpoint, procedural strategy entails identifying system-level procedures that are 
established, and the operators are expected to adhere to these processes  (Leveson et al., 2009). 
Flexible response strategy is the ability of the firm to make decisions that may deviate from 
established plans and protocols to suit the needs of the situation. Flexible response strategy 
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expects that operators may deviate from predetermined plans and adapt to the situation on the 
ground (Leveson et al., 2009). Literature has shown that both responses might be effective. 
However, as of yet, how exposure to and learning from near-miss events leads to organizational 
behaviors in facing disruptions has not been studied (Drupsteen and Wybo, 2015). 
We apply organizational learning theory as related to single and double-loop learning 
(Argyris, 1976) to explain how near-misses result in either flexible or procedural response 
strategies. Single-loop learning focuses on correcting errors using existing behaviors and norms 
(Jeffs et al., 2012). In contrast, double-loop learning aims to modify and adapt firm-wide 
behaviors to effectively treat the underlying cause. We expect that firms may use a flexible 
response strategy when the number of near-misses are low. As the number of near-misses 
increase, the number of exceptions increases and the managers may look for underlying reasons 
as to why these near-misses may happen. Consequently, we expect a shift in strategy to 
procedural response strategy as the number of near-misses increase. 
Organizational learning does not take place in isolation but is heavily influenced by 
institutional contexts. We investigate the role played by institutional pressures on the effects of 
exposure to near-misses (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). We combine the theoretical arguments 
noted above with empirical results using statistical analyses to offer empirical evidence on the 
research question. By doing so, we assess the general and nuanced effects of considering near-
misses in managing supply chain disruptions and thereby determine its effectiveness as a 
mitigation strategy in enhancing supply chain resilience (Bode et al., 2011; Riley et al., 2014; 
Tomlin, 2006). The next section offers background information on near-misses from a broad and 
focused perspective.   
Risk management theoretical lenses – A review 
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Organizational scholars and engineering researchers have examined risk management and 
proposed different theoretical lenses. Whereas we cannot summarize all the theoretical lenses, we 
provide background on three main theoretical lenses that have been employed by management 
scholars – NAT, Swiss cheese model, and HROs.  
NAT, proposed by Perrow (1994) and Sagan (1995), postulates that accidents should be 
expected in any system. Moreover, the rate and the magnitude of accidents are dependent on the 
degree of coupling between the system’s components and the complexity of the system. Tight 
coupling between components contributes to the propagation of failures. In a complex system 
with a large number of potential interactions, the potential for unanticipated failures increases 
dramatically (Sagan, 1995; Wolf, 2001). NAT has been applied in supply chain research when 
examining the traceability of adverse events in complex supply chains and supply chain 
disruption propagation (Scheibe and Blackhurst, 2018; Skilton and Robinson, 2009). However, 
some have called into question the applicability of this theoretical lens in contexts where failures 
occur in systems with loose coupling or low complexity environments (Hopkins, 1999; La Porte 
and Rochlin, 1994; Leveson et al., 2009).  
The Swiss cheese model, proposed by Reason (1977), postulates that systems can have 
multiple defensive layers to protect against potential failures. These defensive layers can either 
rely on the systems’ infrastructure or (constituting hard defenses) or rely on people (constituting 
soft defenses) to determine ways to address potential issues that can lead to failures (Hosseinian 
and Torghabeh, 2012; Reason, 1977). While no defense layer is perfect on its own, the 
combination of layers helps compensate for any particular layer’s shortcoming. Similar to layers 
in Swiss cheese, weaknesses (or holes) are covered by other layers. However, sometimes, the 
errors in all layers can align perfectly to cause a major failure. Conditions for such alignment can 
lay dormant for many years “before they combine with active failures and local triggers to create 
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and accident opportunity” (Reason, 2000; pp 769). Proponents of this model point to famous 
accident in Chernobyl nuclear disaster to illustrate that each layer on its own could have localized 
the damage, but it was the perfect alignment of the layers that resulted in a disaster of such 
magnitude. 
An interesting paradox of the above theories is that they help in recreating the causes that 
lead to catastrophic disasters but do not provide direction on how to avoid conditions that can 
lead to these failures (Reason, 2000). Consequently, management scholars studied risk 
management by examining how HROs perform (Coutu, 2003; Roberts, 1990). HROs, such as 
nuclear power plants, air traffic control, aircraft carriers during peace time, firefighting teams, 
focus on the safety of operations that can result in highly reliable operations (Leveson et al., 
2009; Roberts, 1990). The accident rates in these organizations are very low, despite operating in 
conditions where we should expect high incidences of failures. Researchers found that HROs 
incorporate redundancies, loose-coupling and simulated drills to hone their ability to detect and 
manage failures (Leveson et al., 2009). Leveson et al. (2009) argue that HRO routines may not 
be applicable to other organizations because HRO processes are stable and the focus of an HRO 
organization is not on improving efficiencies but rather on ensuring safety. Although firms can 
learn from these organizations, the lessons may not be directly applicable to firms that do not 
emphasize safety as their main mission (Weick et al., 2008). Further, some HRO researchers 
have argued that typical organizational processes proposed by organizational researchers may not 
be applicable to HROs because they are fundamentally different from typical firms (Roberts, 
1990).  
The above theories focus on catastrophic failures. Although they are inevitable, they are 
not as common as other indicators of failures such as near-misses (Sagan, 1993; Skilton and 
Robinson, 2009). Table 1 (Part 1) provides a summary of the literature on near-misses across 
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different fields of scientific inquiry. As can be seen, a substantial number of publications on near-
misses is in medical sciences, followed by psychology/neurology, engineering and healthcare 
operations. A common acknowledgment across these scientific streams is that the study of near-
misses can improve error identification. Major errors happen too infrequently to develop reliable 
generalizations from them. Instead, the fact that near-misses happen more frequently provides an 
opportunity for identifying patterns and root causes of potential systems related issues. A second 
commonly noted matter across these fields is that effectively identifying and reporting of near-
misses is a challenge in almost all settings. To start, identifying near-misses requires a subjective 
interpretation of a series of events that resulted in no observable negative outcome. It is the 
observer who has to interpret these events as a sign of potentially larger issues. Literature in 
safety science suggests that it is not uncommon for plant management to dismiss near-misses as 
‘unique,’ and ‘nonreplicable’ events (Baumard and Starbuck, 2005). Another important 
observation from safety science and crisis management is that near-miss reporting is discouraged 
as a result of organizational culture and organizational bureaucracies (Barach, 2000).  
--- Insert Table 1 About Here --- 
Table 1 (Part 2) provides a focused view of the literature on near-misses as related to 
supply chain disruptions. In a supply chain context, the focus is on events that pertain to the 
inter-organizational exchange of goods, services, funds, and information (Bode and Macdonald, 
2016). By definition, supply chain near-misses leave no injuries, and no property or equipment 
damage (Williamsen, 2013). Given the focus on efficiency and productivity in supply chain 
operations, near-misses are often ignored because they carry low relevance and low potential 
impact (Lampel et al., 2009). For some, the potential for near-misses is presumed to be part of 
the risks of doing business, thereby suggesting that there may be no need to report such 
divergences from the norm (Juttner et al., 2003). Nevertheless, this literature stream echoes the 
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call made by others:  Information gained from near-misses can help introduce structural and 
behavioral changes that could prevent such catastrophes by terminating the root cause of the 
problem. However, as Table 1-Part 2 suggests, empirically based investigations about the 
benefits of near-misses are scant. Only a handful of studies have explored how experiencing 




Argyris and Schön differentiate between an organization’s learning approach based on 
two clusters, those using Model I and those using Model II (Argyris and Schön, 1974). Model I 
tends to lead to single-loop learning, which relies on a simple problem-solving process. Although 
single-loop learning is adaptive, it does not focus on treating the cause; rather it looks for an 
expeditious solution. While errors are corrected, the underlying issues remain (Stead and 
Smallman, 1999). Model II leads to double-loop learning, which involves comparing the 
situation with existing organizational practices, questioning whether these practices are still 
viable, and justifying whether the company should modify them. Unlike single-loop, double-loop 
learning involves adaptation and modification of firm-specific competencies and routines 
(Argyris and Schön, 1974). The contrast between single and double-loop learning is particularly 
nascent for studying supply chain risk and disruption management. Indeed, organizations 
improve by learning and correcting their errors (Argyris, 1976). In the sections following, we 
will relate the theoretical explanations provided by Argyris and Schön to offer hypotheses on the 
effects of near-miss exposure to flexible and procedural response strategies.  
What organizations focus on to learn about may be influenced by institutional forces. 
Indeed, organizational learning can be initiated by disparate external forces. The institutional 
theory explains how the scope for organizational learning can be rendered through the influence 
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of societal values and structures, which act as “learning triggers” (Scott and Meyer, 1994; Weick, 
1991; Zsidisin et al., 2005). Often associated with coercive pressures, government regulation, is 
one form of institutionalization (Hoffman, 1999). Another learning trigger may be normative 
pressures in the form of industry and professional standards. Industry pressures link normative 
institutional forces to organizational learning because they are based on educational programs, 




Near-misses and supply chain disruption response strategies 
 
 A flexible response orientation is built on the assumption that disruptions are fluid and 
ever-changing events. Plans for addressing supply chain disruptions needs to be adjusted to suit 
the situation at hand (McEntire et al., 2013; Turner, 1995). In firms with a flexible response 
orientation, empowered personnel often help find novel solutions to disruptions. For instance, the 
National Park Service (NPS) firefighters operate in a system that leaves ample room for frontline 
personnel to act independently and creatively, while still integrating their actions into a coherent 
and systemic scheme (Weick, 1993). In firms with a flexible response orientation employees 
close to near-misses could be encouraged to engage in self-initiated and often novel means to 
address the issue, even if their solutions result in developing “work-around” processes that are 
not in line with the protocol (Dillon et al., 2014; Weinstein, 1989). Some employees may develop 
quick-fixes to address the issue and carry on with their work. Others may become more confident 
about their ability to address the issues independently and creatively because of their repeated 
experiences (Jeffs et al., 2012).  
In line with single-loop learning, employees and managers in firms with a flexible 
response orientation close to the issue would try to address the issue using quick-fix resolutions. 
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For instance, in cases where financial issues with a supplier place it close to filing for bankruptcy 
and expose the buyer company to a potential shortage of material, those in charge may simply 
offer a “bridge-loan” to the supplier to fix the immediate matter (Muermann and Oktem, 2002; 
Tessmer, 1997). 
Unlike the NPS, Forest Service (FS) firefighters operate “by the book” (Weick, 1993). FS 
firefighters have a procedural response strategy (Deverell and Olsson, 2010). Focusing on 
procedures allows such organizations to develop reliable protocols to consistently address 
potential disruptions (Seifert, 2007). Activities commonly seen in procedurally focused 
organizations include adhering to a schedule to complete tasks, conducting meetings with 
specifically defined memberships and agenda, and generating and compliance to planning 
documents (John and Martin, 1984).  
Rising frequency of near-misses can raise an organization’s concern about them. The 
recurrence of similar and potentially related near-misses, and more salient information about 
their potential damage tends to raise perceptions of their seriousness and may prompt personnel 
to further scrutinize them (Tinsley et al., 2012). To start, frequent near-misses leads to the need 
for a more thorough and systematic review and analysis of such close-calls (Andriulo and Gnoni, 
2014; Lampel et al., 2009). This rising pressure may require those responsible for the future 
performance of the company to carefully study the root causes of near-misses and apply rules and 
procedures to address them. Further, employees may be discouraged to solve problems in an ad-
hoc manner, i.e., employ a flexible response strategy. Increased frequency also makes it easier to 
spot commonalities among near-misses (Wright and van der Schaaf, 2004). This facilitates the 
possibility of systematically addressing the near-misses by implementing procedures that can 
address several issues at once (Peck, 2005), i.e., use of procedurally oriented response strategy. 
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When addressed at the systems level, lessons can be disseminated beyond the local circumstance 
and can benefit a broader circle.  
Based on double-loop learning, we argue that with frequent near-misses, organizations 
become aware of the underlying causes of potential errors and thus lean towards a procedural 
strategy. A highly-referenced example of lingering root causes comes from the railroad industry: 
the devastating Paddington rail disaster of 1999. As explained by Kleindorfer et al. (2012), in this 
case, safety signals were ignored on numerous occasions, which eventually led to the fatal crash. 
This event and similar major failures eventually led to broadly applied changes in the railroad 
industry. In today’s Germany, for instance, automatic control systems and speed checks are 
commonplace in commercial and cargo trains. This, in essence, is the application of double-loop 
learning to help combine lessons from anomalies to treat the underlying causes of accidents 
(Argyris, 1976). Therefore: 
H1a+b: Exposure to near-misses is a) negatively associated with flexible response 
strategy and b) positively associated with procedural response strategy. 
 
 
Moderating Effects of Institutional Pressures 
Regulatory bodies in a number of industries require companies to record, analyze and report 
near-misses. For example, in clinical trials supply chains, pharmaceutical companies are required 
to demonstrate how they address emerging issues that can hamper their operations and their 
ability to adopt a system-wide response protocol (European Medicines Agency, 2015). In this 
and other industries, regulations act as coercive pressures that force companies to adjust their 
behaviors in order to avoid sanctions, prevent restrictions on their market access and to gain 
legitimacy to ensure their long term competitiveness (Muermann and Oktem, 2002).  
 The coercive effects of regulatory pressures can positively augment the firm’s emphasis 
on strengthening their response strategies. Regulatory pressures can comprise instructions that 
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may lead to flexible or procedural strategies. For instance, similar to the examples provided 
above, companies may be required to not only install near-miss tracking systems but also be able 
to act quickly to sudden and emergent concerns such as news of broad product contamination or 
supply shortage issue. Pressure from regulatory entities may also lead to companies to take near-
misses more seriously and to reflect their experiences with these events in their response 
strategies. Indeed, the positive influence of regulatory forces can be seen in industries exposed to 
a larger level of scrutiny and governmental regulatory protocols. The discussion above leads to 
the following hypotheses:  
H2a+b: Institutional pressure from regulatory bodies increases the association between 
exposure to near-misses and a) flexible and b) procedural response strategy. 
 
Industrial associations and professional standards carry normative pressures on 
organizational behavior (Scott, 2001). Unlike coercive forces, normative pressures are developed 
as a result of shared education, frames of mind and overall professional experience. For instance, 
the electronics industry has formed a coalition among manufacturers that provides a forum to 
discuss the risks associated with issues such as child labor, environmental pollutions, 
sustainability and other social and supply chain matters (Vogel, 2010). Professionals working for 
companies engaged with the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) become 
acclimated with norms and protocols that other companies are using. As a result, these 
professionals are better aware of the underlying severity associated with near-misses. It follows 
that they may be more prone to react to these situations at the local level by developing ad-hoc 
disruption solutions.  
Through industry associations, professional education and other related normative forces, 
managers may be influenced to better identify, analyze and make use of near-miss incidents. 
Managers might not only be influenced to carry skills and awareness as tools to identify a near-
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miss and to quantify them, but also have the awareness that near-misses will not be left unnoticed 
or ignored. It is also possible that managers may learn to consider near-misses as 
“complimentary” lessons because no harm was materialized from the event, and that they 
actually might help surface root cause of larger systemic issues. We thus argue that firms in 
industries with high normative pressure will pursue higher levels of procedural and flexible 
disruption responses.  
H3a+b: Institutional pressure from industry increases the association between exposure 
to near-misses and a) flexible and b) procedural response strategy. 
 
Research methodology 
Sampling frame and Non-response bias 
We targeted senior executives and managers involved in supply chain partnerships in 
manufacturing firms and limited our respondents to NAICS industry codes in manufacturing (32 
and 33). An identical procedure was used to collect data from manufacturing firms in Sweden, 
Switzerland, and Germany. We randomly selected 1,000 firms in each country using the 
following databases: Statistics Sweden’s register of Swedish firms: Economic Statistics 
Department and Affärsdata, European databases EPO, the Federation of the Swiss Watch 
Industry (FH), German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) Berlin and the Chamber for 
Industry and Commerce. We excluded multinational firms from the sampling frame. We 
screened and eliminated duplicates firms that may be in multiple databases. We followed the 
procedure recommended by Dillman (1991)  and sent direct mail questionnaires. Following a 
four-wave mailing, 448 usable questionnaires were produced reflecting a response rate of 
approximately 14.9 percent. As related to non-response bias, we compared the first and second 
wave respondents on the key variables of the study. The tests did not reveal any statistically 
significant differences (p < 0.05), indicating that there were no issues with non-response bias.  
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Measures 
 
We define a near-miss event as an occasion where the company comes close to being affected by 
a supply chain disruption, but it was not. Our questionnaire asked about the number of near-
misses occurring at a facility. This premise (frequency of near-misses) is a common measure in 
similar studies in medical establishments (Wahlberg et al., 2013) operational safety (Jones et al., 
1999) and transportation (Groeger and Chapman, 1996) among others. We measured the 
frequency of near-misses that were initiated by different sources separately and combined them 
(upstream suppliers, internal functions, downstream customers and sources external to supply 
chain). We measured regulatory pressure using four items to evaluate how federal and local 
agencies stipulate firms to develop crisis management plans and business continuity plans. We 
expanded on the definitions provided on regulatory pressure and adapted it to the context of 
supply chain disruptions (Zsidisin et al., 2005). Similarly, we measured industry pressure using 
items to evaluate how industry standards and trade associations provide influence development 
of crisis management plans and business continuity plans (Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002; 
Zsidisin et al., 2005). 
We developed items for flexible response strategy based on two relevant studies 
(McEntire et al., 2013; Turner, 1995) that measure how organizations adapt and improvise 
existing plans based on the uncertainty of the situation. We developed measures for procedural 
response strategy from formalization literature (Sivadas and Dwyer, 2000; Tenhiälä and 
Salvador, 2014) and adapted them to the context of disruption management.  




To control for contextual factors, we included several measures. We included firm age 
product maturity and firm size (Ln Number of employees) to control for the culture of the 
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organization (Azadegan and Wagner, 2011; Li et al., 2015; Wei et al., 2017),. Older firms may 
have established processes that have been instituted over time. Also, firms with more mature 
products are typically associated with greater cost-leadership, which requires rigid processes to 
control the efficiency of outputs (Brumme et al., 2015; Gupta and Lonial, 1998). Similarly, larger 
firms tend to institute processes to address various exception scenarios during their day-to-day 
operations. We included industry to control for industry level factors that may influence firms to 
institute procedural response strategies. For instance, firms in pharmaceutical industries are 
subject to external regulatory factors that may require firms to institute procedural response 
strategies more than flexible response strategies. We included supply chain position and 
environmental dynamism to control for any structure related factors that may require firms to 
pursue one strategy over the other (Demeter, 2014; Kinra and Kotzab, 2008). We used dummy 
variables to control for country because the data were collected in different countries. Finally, we 
controlled for small disruption frequency because firms with greater frequency of small 
disruptions may institute processes and strategies to address these issues. 
Measure validation 
 
We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess the unidimensionality of the constructs. 
We assessed the measurement model fit using a chi-squared statistic (χ
2
), comparative fit index 
(CFI), the goodness of fit index (GFI), Bentler-Bonett normed fit index (NFI), Tucker-Lewis 
index (TLI), root mean squared error approximation (RMSEA) and standardized root mean 
square residual (SRMR). The confirmatory factor analysis yielded χ
2
 (253) = 818.571; RMSEA = 
0.071; SRMR = 0.050; CFI = 0.929; GFI = 0.873; TLI = 0.916. The model fit indices were above 
the recommended thresholds (Hu and Bentler, 1999). This indicates that the measures for latent 
variables are acceptable. We also assessed reliability, convergent validity and discriminant 
 
 
International Journal of Production Economics, Azadegan, Srinivasan, Blome, 
Tajeddini 
 
 Page 18 
validity of the constructs. Detailed statistics on loadings, reliability, and AVEs are presented in 
Table 3. 
Common method bias 
To dampen the effects of common method bias, the survey was designed using different scale 
formats and anchors for the key variables. In addition, we tested for common method bias in the 
following ways. First, we conducted a version of Harman’s one-factor test to verify that there is 
no bias in results because of a single respondent. We followed the methodology suggested by 
Malhotra et al. (2006) and also used the marker-variable technique (Lindell and Whitney, 2001) 
to test for common method bias. Based on these tests we conclude that common method bias is 
not significant in our dataset. 
Analysis and results 
 
We tested our hypotheses using hierarchical regression models (Table 4). We first introduced the 
control variables (model xM1), then we introduced variables to assess the main effects (models 
xM2), then we introduced interaction terms (models xM3 and xM4). Finally, we introduced all 
the variables (model xM5).  
 Focusing on the results on the left-hand side of Table 4, model FM2 shows that the 
frequency of near-misses (p < 0.01) is negatively related to flexible response. This supports our 
hypothesis H1a. The interaction term “NM x Reg. Pressure” (model FM3) is statistically 
significant providing support for hypothesis H2a. Finally, the results in model FM5 show that 
“NM x Ind. Pressure” is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05), providing support for 
hypothesis H3a. We plotted the interaction graphs of these results in Figure 1 (1-1 and 1-2). We 
discuss the implications of these results in the next section. 
--- Insert Figure 1 About Here --- 
Focusing on the results in the right-hand side of Table 4, model PM2 shows that the 
frequency of near-misses (p < 0.001) is positively related to procedural response. Thus, 
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hypothesis H1b is supported. We tested hypothesis H2b by introducing the interaction term “NM 
x Reg. Pressure” (PM3) in the regression equation. The results show that the interaction term is 
not statistically significant; thus, hypothesis H2b is not supported. The results show that the 
regulatory pressure has a positive effect (p < 0.05) on the procedural response. Finally, the results 
in model PM5 show that “NM x Ind. Pressure” is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05), 
providing support for hypothesis H3b. We plotted an interaction graph (Figure 1-3) to illustrate 
the moderating influence of industry pressure on the relationship between near-misses and 
procedural response.  
--- Insert Tables 4 About Here --- 
Discussion 
 
Our research question in this study investigates whether exposure to near-misses reflects 
in organizational response strategies to supply chain disruptions. Our results offer empirical 
evidence worthy of note. As hypothesized, exposure to near-misses is associated with a rise in 
procedural response strategies. This is an interesting finding, considering that (as explored earlier 
in the paper) strong factors challenge the reporting and institutionalization of lessons learned 
from near-misses. It is encouraging to see that in general, firms are able to digest this information 
and develop proactive risk mitigation processes. This finding is in contrast to studies in 
neuroscience  (Clark et al., 2009) and management research (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008) that find 
that following near-miss events, individuals/managers tend to lower their perceived risk level and 
raise the desire to take risks. These findings suggest that managers may pursue riskier 
alternatives, as a result of exposure to near-misses. In our study, conducted at the organizational 
level, the results suggest that exposure to near-misses leads to more procedural and systematized 
approaches to how disasters are handled. In other words, at the organizational level, exposure to 
near-misses may limit the propensity to choose riskier propositions. Given that organizational 
decisions are likely to involve discussions and resolutions to differing opinions (Cyert and 
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March, 1963), exposing and studying near-misses leads firms to take on more cautious, and 
procedural approach to potential supply chain disruptions.  
Second, and interestingly different from our theoretical arguments, results suggest that 
with increased exposure to near-misses, companies lower their application of flexible response 
strategy. In many cases, near-misses are likely to be recognized and addressed by those in the 
immediacy of the issue; at the departmental levels. As we explained in earlier sections, one 
would expect a rise in personnel awareness, which is likely to result in ad-hoc and localized 
solutions to rise when facing similar circumstances. Indeed, studies related to hospital operations 
explore how near-miss, and small disruptions are more often addressed at the local level (Tucker 
and Edmondson, 2002). The fact that exposure to near-misses is significantly related to lower 
flexible response strategy suggests that, as related to supply chain disruptions, firms tend to shy 
away from emphasizing localized and emergent resolutions of such issues.  
From an organizational learning perspective, the collection of insights from this study 
regarding flexible and procedural response strategies can seem interestingly paradoxical. 
Organizational learning theory often suggests that firms are more influenced by myopic and short 
term decision preferences and often discount the long term possibilities of their experiences 
(Azadegan and Dooley, 2010; Levinthal and March, 1993). The myopia explanation on 
organizational learning would imply that companies would react to more near-misses by 
increasing the use of their short-term learnings; implying a rise in the use of flexible response 
strategies. In contrast, we find that exposure to more near-miss events raises considerations for a 
more long-term and systemic view of the issues by implementing procedural response strategies. 
The results here suggest that, as related to disruption response and risk management, 
organizational behavior may be more complicated than expected. Indeed, while single and 
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double-loop learning may take place at the same time, when near-misses increase, the primacy of 
double-loop learning can be more pronounced.  
Our study clarifies how regulatory and industry pressures place a significant, yet distinct 
influence on the effects of exposure to near-misses. With increased exposure to near-misses, 
regulatory pressure helps to lower the emphasis placed by firms on flexible response strategy. 
This may be explained by the fact that firms facing substantial regulatory expectations must 
refrain from ad hoc and emergent decisions, perhaps because such response strategies may seem 
less organized and in contrast to governmental expectations. Interestingly, the influence of 
regulatory pressures as a moderator on procedural response was not significant. This finding 
could be explained by the fact that broadly enforced regulations requiring documentation of near-
misses has yet to be broadly implemented except in a handful of industries (Phimister et al., 
2003).  
Specific to flexible response strategy and institutional pressures as moderating factors, we 
see a picture consistent with that of findings from direct effects. Industry pressure thwarts the 
negative association between near-miss exposure and flexible response strategy (Figure 1). 
Whereas frequent near-misses lead to lowered flexible response strategy and moving away from 
localized decision making, industry pressure helps maintain some of the focus on flexible 
response. The contrast between the effects of industrial and regulatory pressures on the 
procedural response is also interesting. Unlike regulatory pressure, industry pressure further 
attenuates using procedural response with exposure to near-misses (Figure 1). Arguably, the 
influence of normative pressure (i.e., inclination to look to a network of professionals and 
industry-based standards for legitimacy) seems to be a more effective than the influence forced 
by the need to conform to regulations at the risk of sanctions and penalties.  
Combined, these results strongly support that, as related to supply chain disruptions, it is 
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important to consider the role of external constituents in organizational learning. Results also 
suggest that the upcoming stream on learning and knowledge exchange in supply chains (Blome 
et al., 2014; Handfield et al., 2015) should further extend their focus to non-traditional supply 
chain members (e.g., industry bodies, regulators). Firms are not only encouraged by their 
constituents to pay close attention to learning from near-misses, but those that do pay attention 
are likely to improve their crisis management response strategies.  
By combining institutional theory and institutional learning, the findings here provide 
interesting explanations on how different institutions trigger learning patterns. One potential 
reason for these varied results may be that tracking near-misses, as related to supply chain 
disruptions, is not widely enforced. Interestingly, industrial norms and practices seem more 
effective in this regard than regulations. This finding is in contrast to research on environmental 
practices, which has showcased how regulatory pressure leads firms to implement practices that 
they otherwise would only symbolically address (Short and Toffel, 2010). It has also been shown 
that industry-based interests (e.g., provided through contractual partners) can be important to 
nurture activities that go beyond compliance and lead to committed implementation (Blome et 
al., 2015).  
Conclusion & Contribution 
 
As of late, the literature on supply chain risk has highlighted the importance of supply 
chain resilience in facing disruptions (Blackhurst et al., 2011; Craighead et al., 2007; Pettit et al., 
2010). In this study, we enquired as to whether exposure to near-misses can help companies 
refine their response strategies in facing supply chain disruptions. Judging from the focus that 
many industry leaders place on near-misses, the question should be of interest to practitioners 
and researchers alike. Theoretically, organizational learning scholars suggest that companies can 
learn from these close-calls to better prepare for and limit the potential for larger size disruptions. 
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While earlier studies in other fields offer mixed findings on the learning potentials from near-
misses, we find that firms do indeed learn significantly from such events.  
Beyond extending previous findings about near-misses to the supply chain context, this 
study offers other contributions to research and practitioner fields. To start, this work offers 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on how companies learn from and incorporate their 
learning.  Specifically, the fact that near-misses are important influences on the second order, and 
arguably long term, learning approaches by companies is a contribution that can be benefited 
from by researchers and practitioners in supply chain management.  
Contribution to organizational theory stems from the effort to combine two theories often 
applied to explain very dissimilar phenomena in tandem. As we noted above, organizations do 
not learn in a vacuum and what they focus on learning about is contingent on external pressures.  
With regards to institutional pressures, we extend research by highlighting how, to our surprise, 
forceful and coercive pressures based on authoritative voices may be less effective. Instead, the 
influence of one’s industrial comrades may be more potent.  
Limitations & Future Research 
Findings in this study should be considered alongside their potential limitations. First, near-
misses are ambiguous phenomena that may be documented using different methods. We 
measured near-misses using a count variable. Future research may consider looking at 
differentiating near-misses based on their source, level of potential impact and the possible 
probability of leading to actual disruptions. Second, we focused on only two important 
institutional pressures. Future studies may consider incorporating external pressures that 
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Table 1 – Part 1: Literature on near-miss across scientific disciplines (The Broad View) 
 
Fields of Science and Article Count 
 




 Near-miss reporting offers numerous organizational benefits. 
By collecting near-misses medical science can better 
understand recovery patterns through the capture, study, and 
improvement of discovery processes. 
General Medicine Pediatrics, Internal Medicine, Gynecology 279 
 
Medical Disorders Hepatology, Oncology, Respiratory 90 Barach et al. (2000) 
Basic Medical Research Hematology, Pathology, Immunology 55 Fairbanks et al. (2008) 
Pharmacology Toxicology, Substance Abuse 54 
 




Cognitively, near-miss events influence behavior by "recruiting 
brain areas" triggering loss aversion and thus increasing 
motivation to try again. In organizations, frequency in near-
miss reporting can be increased with improved culture and 
upper management involvement. 
Applied Research Psychiatry, Clinical Psychology 56 Mearns et al. (1998) 
Basic research - Behavioral Experimental/Mathematical Psychology 52 Clark et al. (2009) 






Near-miss evaluation can be effective accident pre-cursor data 
in production systems as they can help identify underlying 
causes that could be controlled by management. 
Production systems Industrial, Civil, Mechanical 116 Bier (1990) 





Near-miss analysis can help with recognition and analysis of 
errors, determination of patterns of errors, and monitoring for 
changes in frequency after corrective action is implemented. 
Critical Care Critical Care, ER, Radiology 42 Clarke et al. (2002) 
Nursing and Surgery Transplantation, Healthcare services 91 Callum et al. (2001) 
Public Health Policy Public Health, Urban studies 95 Storeng et al. (2010) 
Near-misses avert fatal loss, but also carry severe ramifications 
on the affected. 
Safety Literature Occupational safety, Haz Mat 80 Carroll (1998) 
Frequency of near-misses can increase because of ineffective 
work procedures 
Emergency Mgt. First Responder Reporting 20 Wright et al. (2004) 
Organizational culture may discourage sharing findings among 
EMS. 
Operations Mgt. Decision Science, Org Learning 18 Dillon et al. (2008) 
Interpreting near-misses as successes may make managers less 
risk-averse. 
Transport Systems Traffic Studies, Transport Technology 18 Goerlandt et al. (2011) 
Recognized accident risk factors are also attributed to near-
miss events. 
Finance & Economics Bankruptcies, Credit Risk 6 Tessmer (1997) 
Studying near-misses helps with predictive accuracy of credit-
risk assessment. 
Supply Chain Mgt. See Part 2 
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Table 1 – Part 2: Literature on near-miss across scientific disciplines (Focused view - Supply chain management related fields) 
 
Study Relevant Findings Type of Risk Industry 
Muermann & Ulku (2002) 
Analyzing near-misses can be a risk-reduction tool in assessing financial 
viability of firms. 
Operational risk Banking 
Phimster et al. (2003) 
An effective near-miss program emphasizes dissemination and resolution 
of reported cases. 
Production/environmental Chemicals 
Wright & vd Schaaf (2004) 
Supports to the "common cause" hypothesis; near miss and accidents 
have same root issues. 
Safety/Production Transportation 
Peck (2005) 




Handfield et al. (2007) 
Companies are more willing to invest in supply chain redesign post near-
miss events. 
Operational Risk Multiple Industries 
Kim & Miner (2007) Learning from near-misses in banking improves performance. Bank Failures Financial markets 
Pettit et al. (2010) Near-miss analysis is a form of adaptive resilience capability. Operational risk Multiple Industries 
Tinsley et al. (2011) 
Offers anecdotal cases on how attention to near misses can predict and 
prevent crises. 
Operational risk Multiple Industries 
Dillon et al. (2011) Near-miss experience with hurricanes leads to over-confidence. Natural Disasters Housing 
Kleindorfer et al. (2012) 
Details near-miss management system and justifies how it can improve 
profitability. 
Process Safety Multiple Industries 
Williamsen (2013) 
Offers explanations as to why near miss reporting is missing in many 
organizations. 
Worker Safety Multiple Industries 
Dillon et al. (2014) Near-miss reporting is contingent on a positive safety climate Natural Disasters Housing 
Andriulo & Gnoni (2014) 
Areas with higher error rate have lower tendency to report near miss 
events. 
Worker Safety Auto Industry 
Sheffi (2015) 
Offers anecdotal examples of how companies use near-miss to improve 
performance. 
Operational risk Multiple Industries 
Habermann et al. (2015) Near-misses (Close calls) are one form of disruption risk. Operational risk Multiple Industries 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 
 
Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Procedural Response  4.08 1.19 
         
(2) Flexible Response 3.71 1.29 0.124
**
 
        





       





      







     









    








 -0.061 0.001 
   
























(10) Industry Pressure  4.12 0.92 0.054 0.050 0.126
**
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Table 3: CFA Model Fit and Item Loadings 
 
Construct Item code Item Std. loading CR; AVE 
Procedural 
response 
PR1 Use of established policies and procedures play a major role 0.841 
0.897; 
0.685 
PR2 How past disruptions have been managed is documented and referred to 0.779 
PR3 Role, responsibilities and ownership of problems are rigidly followed 0.838 
PR4 Allocating resources is through formalized requests and approvals 0.852 
Flexible 
response 





FR2 Plans are adjusted and modified throughout the course of a disruption 0.913 
FR3 Decisions are made based on the situation at hand 0.907 
FR4 Following the chain of command takes a back seat to quickly addressing the disruption 0.777 
Near 
misses 




Initiated in your organization and affected upstream and downstream members of the supply chain without stopping 
or significantly slowing down their production. 
0.899 
NM3 
Initiated because of actions or decisions of your downstream customers and affected your operations without 
stopping or significantly slowing down your production. 
0.920 
NM4 
Initiated as a result of other factors and affected more than one member of your supply chain without stopping or 




IP1 Industry standards influence our implementation of a Crisis Management Plan. 0.861 
0.902; 
0.756 
IP2 Generally agreed upon practices of our trade associations’ influence our implementation of a Business Continuity 
Plan.  
0.940 










RP2 Our local regulations influence our implementation and update of a Crisis Management Plan. 0.626 
RP3 Our federal (country level) regulations influence our implementation and update of a Business Continuity Plan.  0.920 
RP4 Our federal (country level) regulations influence our implementation of a Crisis Management Plan.  0.590 
Small 
disruptions 
SD1 Initiated in your organization and affected upstream and downstream members of the supply chain. 0.749 
0.879; 
0.709 
SD2 Initiated because of actions or decisions of your downstream customers and affected your operations 0.965 
SD3 Initiated as a result of other factors and affected more than one member of your supply chain. 0.797 
Product 
Maturity 
PM1 Our products are mature (are in the late stages of product innovation life cycle).  0.841 0.877; 
0.704 PM2 We operate in a market that has been well established in terms of competitors.  0.869 
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PM3 In general, our products can be described as commodity rather than as distinctively novel. 0.805 
Chi-square (DF) = 818.571 (253);  RMSEA = 0.071; SRMR = 0.050; CFI = 0.929; GFI = 0.873; TLI = 0.916  
 
Table 4: Regression Results for Flexible and Procedural Response 
 Stepwise Regression for Flexible Response Strategy  Stepwise Regression for Procedural Response Strategy 
Variable FM1 FM2 FM3 FM4 FM5  PM1 PM2 PM3 PM4 PM5 











































SC Position Dummy Included Included Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included Included 













































































































































NM x Ind. Pressure 


































 0.122 0.137 0.164 0.16 0.179 
 
0.177 0.411 0.42 0.422 0.437 
F 5.19 5.07 5.69 5.82 6.14  6.49 16.9 16.2 15.2 15.4 
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ΔR
2
 - 0.015 0.027 0.023 0.042 
 
- 0.234 0.009 0.011 0.026 
(1) † p ≤ 0.10; * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001;  
(2) Model xM1 – Control; xM2 – Direct model; xM3 – Regulatory pressure interaction model;  
xM4 – Industry pressure interaction model; xM5 – Combined interaction model 
(3) Δ R
2 
for models xM3, xM4, and xM5 are in
 
comparison to model xM2
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Figure 1 – Interaction Effects of Regulatory/Industry Pressure on Response Strategies 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire used to collect data 
 
 Consider the following examples of small disruptions:  
1) Parts shortages by a JIT supplier causes minor production downtime for you, the manufacturer.  
2) Production scheduling error by you, the manufacturer causes the supplier to have to shut down its line for few hours.  
3) Weather related issues delay delivery of multiple supplier parts, causing production shutdown.  
4) A sudden surge in electricity usage causes you, the manufacturer to lose production for several hours. 
 
 Note that in all of the cases, the flow of (a) goods, (b) information and (c) funds is severed for a limited time so as to have a 
recordable negative effect on an operation. How many similar disruptions does your operation face in a typical month that are:  
1) Initiated because of actions or decisions of your suppliers and severed your operational flows.     _______________ 
2) Initiated in your organization and affected upstream and downstream members of the supply chain.    ___________ 
3) Initiated because of actions or decisions of your downstream customers and affected your operations    __________ 




 Consider the following examples of near-misses:  
1) Parts shortages by a JIT supplier could have caused minor but costly production downtime for you, the manufacturer, but was 
diverted by using an alternate part.  
2) Production scheduling error by you, the manufacturer, could have caused the supplier to have to shut down its line for few 
hours but was diverted.  
3) Because of weather related issues and delayed the delivery of multiple supplier parts was delayed and your production came 
close to slowing down.  
4) A sudden surge in electricity usage could have caused the manufacturer to lose production for several hours but the matter was 
diverted.  
 
Note that in all of the above cases, the flow of (a) goods, (b) information and (c) funds is not severed, but affected their 
operation without stopping or significantly slowing down their production.  
1) Initiated because of actions or decisions of your suppliers and came close to severing your operational flows. __________ 
2) Initiated in your organization and affected upstream and downstream members of the supply chain without stopping or 
significantly slowing down their production. __________ 
3) Initiated because of actions or decisions of your downstream customers and affected your operations without stopping or 
significantly slowing down your production. ___________ 
4) Initiated as a result of other factors and affected more than one member of your supply chain without stopping or 




 1 2 3 4 5 
In your organization: SD  D  N  A  SA  
Procedural response 
(1) Use of established policies and procedures play a major role  1  2  3  4  5  
(2) How past disruptions have been managed is documented and referred to.  1  2  3  4  5  
(3) Role, responsibilities and ownership of problems are rigidly followed.  1  3  3  4  5  
(4) Allocating resources is through formalized requests and approvals  1  2  3  4  5  
Flexible response 
(5) Ad-hoc and emergent decisions are relied upon heavily  1  2  3  4  5  
(6) Plans are adjusted and modified throughout the course of a disruption  1  2  3  4  5  
(7) Decisions are made based on the situation at hand  1  2  3  4  5  
(8) Following the chain of command takes a back seat to quickly addressing 
the disruption  
1  2  3  4  5  
 
 
 
